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of election for the city government and does not have to provide for
the same method as is used to elect its members, it may by special
law allow the voters of the city to choose their own method.' 9 Hence
there is no question here of an ultra vires act on the part of the city;
it is merely acting under a special law.
Thus it is seen that under P. R. there is nothing inconsistent
with the plurality system of voting; it does not prevent a voting for all
officers so far as the intendment of that phrase is interpreted; the voter
may vote for each candidate to be elected but with a slight variation of
a serial order under which a vote is really a choice. It is within the
power of a legislature to allow cities to choose their own method of
election so far as secrecy of voting is not destroyed; the legislature
is not compelled to prescribe the single member district system for
the election of city councilmen; and, lastly, P. R. is not expressly nor
impliedly prohibited.20 In view of these facts the case
for the con2
stitutionality of P. R. in this state seems plausible. 1

MICHAEL J. O'REILLY.

CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS FOR THE NON-PAYMENT OF ALIMONY-A
CONSIDERATION OF SECTION 1172A OF THE CIVIL PRACTICE ACT.

It has been generally held that contempt proceedings will be
allowed for non-payment of alimony as a remedial process necessary
to secure to the wife an allowance for the support and maintenance
of herself and her children and to prevent them from becoming public
charges.' The necessity for such proceedings justifies its allowance.
1

,N. Y.

CONST.

Art. XII, §§ 2, 5.

'0 State ex rel. Otto v. Kansas City, 310 Mo. 542, 276 S. W. 389 (1925)

(in which it was held that the departure by Kansas City from the Bicameral
Council was valid, there being no constitutional or statutory provision requiring the council to consist of two houses).
' Commonwealth ex rel. McCormick v. Reeder, 171 Pa. 505, 33 Ati. 67
(1895). In this case an act providing for the election of a given number of
judges notwithstanding the fact that an elector was not allowed to vote for
as many persons as there were places to be filled was held constitutional.
The question of limited voting was raised in two" New York cases. People
ex rel. Wood v. Crissey, 91 N. Y. 616 (1883) ; People ex rel. Watkins v.
Perley, 80' N. Y. 624 (1880) (The question of constitutionality was not
discussed and the case was decided on other grounds.). For a study of
Cincinnati's experience with proportional representation see TAFT CITY ADmINISTRATION (2d ed. 1933) pp. 96-110. For an exhaustive study of proportional representation see HOAG AND HALLT, PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATIoN (1926).
1
Ex parte Hall, 125 Ark. 309, 188 S. W. 827 (1916) ; Woodard v. Woodard, 172 Ga. 713, 158 S. E. 569 (1931) ; Heflinger v. Heflinger, 172 Ga. 889,
159 S. E. 242 (1931) ; Toth v. Toth, 242 Mich. 23, 217 N. W. 913, 56 A. L. R.
839 (1928); Romaine v. Chauncey, 129 N. Y. 566, 29 N. E. 826 (1892);
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A mere order to pay alimony would often prove ineffectual. It is
frequently the threat of incarceration that furnishes the only motive
for compliance with the decree. 2 But despite recognition of the need
and use for such proceedings, we find an enormous amount of litigation arising out of situations where the divorced or separated husband, against whom the decree has been rendered, seeks to avoid
commitment on the ground that he is financially unable to comply
with the order of the court. In New York, prior to September 1,
1933, the situation was especially deplorable. Upon motion by the
wife, the defaulting husband was imprisoned, the court utterly disregarding his inability to comply with the decree. 3 It was only after
commitment that the court would entertain a motion for his release
upon the ground of financial inability. 4 In the interim, however, the
husband was deprived of all opportunities to earn any money. The
wife certainly did not experience any material benefits, and the community was shouldered with the burden of supporting a prisoner who
was not a criminal but merely a victim of fortuitous circumstances.
Furthermore, there was the possibility that the same community
would have to support the wife and children as public charges.
Finally, under the concerted pressure of many contributing factors,
one of which was the then existing chaotic condition of the economic
world, the legislature relieved this somewhat archaic conception of
2 SCHOULER, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, SEPARATION AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS (6th
ed. 1921) § 1835. Contra: In re Kinsolving, 135 Mo. App. 631, 116 S. W.
1068 (1909); Francis v. Francis, 192 Mo. App. 710, 179 S. W. 975 (1915)
(the courts of Missouri holding that a decree for alimony creates but a debt,
imprisonment for which is prohibited by the federal constitution). The true
doctrine, however, is that a decree for alimony is essentially different from an
ordinary debt or judgment for money. It is an order compelling a husband
to support his wife and this is a public as well as marital duty-a moral as
well as a legal obligation. The liability is not based upon a contract to pay
money but upon the refusal to perform a duty. The imprisonment is not
ordered simply to enforce the payment of -money, but to punish for the willful
disobedience of a proper order of a court of competent jurisdiction. West
v. West, 126 Va. 696, 101 S. E. 876 (1920).
2Roper v. Roper, 242 Ky. 683, 47 S. W. (2d) 517 (1932); Potters v.
Potters, 133 Misc. 28, 231 N. Y. Supp. 33 (1928).
3
Strobridge v. Strobridge, 21 Hun 288 (N. Y. 1880); Ryckman v. Ryckman, 34 Hun 235, 98 N. Y. 639 (1885); Delanoy v. Delanoy, 19 App. Div.
295, 46 N. Y. Supp. 106 (1st Dept. 1897); Compton v. Compton, 125 App.
Div. 859, 110 N. Y. Supp. 775 (1st Dept. 1908) ; Thompson v. Thompson, 197
App. Div. 228, 188 N. Y. Supp. 785 (2d Dept. 1921); Young v. Young, 35
Misc. 335, 71 N. Y. Supp. 944 (1901). Contra: Noland v. Noland, 29 Hun
63 (N. Y. 1883) (wherein at p. 631 the court said: "Imprisonment and consequent disgrace should not be put upon a person who is too poor to pay").
'JUDICIARY LAW § 775, as amended by N. Y. Laws 1933, c. 688: "where
an offender, imprisoned as prescribed in this article is unable * * * to pay
the sum * * * required to be paid * * *, the court * * * may, in its * * *
discretion, and upon such terms as justice requires, make an order, directing
him to be discharged from the imprisonment." Staples v. Staples, 206 App.
Div. 196, 200 N. Y. Supp. 583 (1st Dept. 1923); Politano v. Politano, 146
Misc. 792, 262 N. Y. Supp. 802 (1933).
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justice and passed Section 1172a of the Civil Practice Act.5 The
important feature of this Act is contained in subd. 3, which in effect, permits a defendant, upon a motion to punish him for contempt
for non-compliance with the provisions of an alimony decree, to interpose as a valid defense his financial inability to make payment
and to ask the court for a modification of the decree. 6 In this enactment the legislature has adopted the rule of the weight of authority
as expressed in the decisions of the majority of the states. 7
What is now the status in New York of the husband who has
defaulted in his alimony payments? If he has already been incar-8
cerated, the relief afforded to him by subd. 1 of the Section
is not novel, for even prior to its enactment, the husband could,
under Section 750 of the Judiciary Law 9 petition the court for his
release from imprisonment upon the ground of financial inability to
make payments. The important feature of the statute, contained in
subd. 3 represents an improvement upon former procedure in so far
as it permits the husband to interpose his plea of poverty as a defense to a motion by the wife to punish him for contempt. But how
shall the court determine whether or not the defendant is in fact
without means? Shall the burden be placed upon the defendant to
conclusively prove his financial inability to pay, or shall there be
demanded of the wife proof sufficient to establish the financial means
of the husband to comply with the decree? It is with a consideraIN. Y. Crv. PRAc. AcT (1933) § 1172a.

"3. Any person may assert his financial inability to comply with the directions contained in an order or judgment made or entered in an action for
divorce or separation or an action for the enforcement in this state of a judgment for divorce or separation rendered in another state, as a defense in a
proceeding instituted against him under section 1172 of this act or under the
judiciary law to punish him for his failure to comply with such directions and,
if the court, upon the hearing of such contempt proceeding, is satisfied from
the proofs and evidence offered and submitted that the defendant is financially
unable to comply with such order or judgment, it may, in its discretion, until
further order of the court, make an order modifying such order or judgment
and denying the application to punish the defendant for contempt."
'Peel v. Peel, 50 Iowa 521 (1879); Wells v. Wells, 99 Wash. 492, 169
Pac. 970 (1918) ; Stuart v. Stuart, 130 Wash. 68, 226 Pac. 133 (1924) ; Staples
v. Staples, 87 Wis. 592, 58 N. W. 1036 (1894).
s"1. Any person who, by an order or judgment made or entered in an action
for divorce or separation or an action for the enforcement in this state of a
judgment for divorce or separation rendered in another state, is directed to
make payment of any sum or sums of money, and against whom an order to
punish for contempt of court has been made pursuant to the provisions of
section 1172 of this act or the judiciary law may, if financially unable to comply with the order or judgment to make such payment, upon such notice to
such parties as the court may direct, make application to the court for an
order relieving him from such payment and such contempt order. The court,
upon the hearing of such application, if satisfied from the proofs and evidence
offered and submitted that the applicant is financially unable to make such
payment may, in its discretion, until further order of the court, modify the
order or judgment to make such payment and relieve him from such contempt
order."
OSupra note 4.
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tion of this important question of burden of proof in conjunction
with a discussion of the purpose and effect of Section 1172a, that
the remainder of this note will concern itself.
A reading of the statute discloses no hard and fast rule governing the granting of the relief contemplated therein. To attempt
the formulation of such a rule would be sheer folly as each case presents a human problem peculiarly its own, calling for a decision
based upon a careful consideration of the facts and circumstances
surrounding the individual case. Instead, such relief isplaced within
the "discretion of the court." 10 While this phrase is not susceptible
of accurate definition, it can hardly be contended that it confers upon
the court the right to arbitrarily place the burden of proof upon
either party, depending upon the judge's personal sociological views
on the subject of contempt proceedings. "Discretion," wrote Lord
Mansfield, "must not be arbitrary, vague or fanciful, but legal and
regular." 11 In exercising their "discretionary powers" the judges
are to be governed by definite, uniform principles designed to -produce a decision based upon sound and deliberate judgment so as to
advance the ends of justice. 1 2 We have seen, that prior to 1933, the
law in New York permitted a defendant to plead poverty only after
he had been committed to prison. 13 The rigors of this system, bitterly referred to as "petticoat justice" by Judge Bonynge, 14 were
recognized by the courts who therefore were rather prone to release
a defendant from imprisonment upon petition. 15 In those cases, however, the defendant's inability to pay was somewhat easy to determine since it was obvious that he could not earn any money while
in jail especially where the income was wholly derived from salary
or wages. Therefore, in the absence of evidence tending to show
that the defendant was contumacious in conduct, the courts were justified in accepting the plea of poverty and releasing the husband from
jail. But that situation is hardly parallel with that which exists
today. The husband today, upon interposing his defense of poverty
to a motion to have him punished for contempt has not yet been in-

*

I"
* * the court * * * may, in its discretion, * * * make an order
* * denying the application to punish the defendant for contempt." See

Editorial, 90 N. Y, L. J.992, Sept. 25, 1933.
'Rex v. Wilkes, 4 Burr. (K. B.) 2527, 2539 (1770).
Platt v. Munroe, 34 Barb. 291, 292 (N. Y. 1861).
'iSupra note 4.
14 See Politano v. Politano, 146 Misc. 792, 262 N. Y. Supp. 802
(1933).
'In
the Politano case. supra note 14, the evidence showed that the husband had suffered severely as a result of the depression and was apparently
unable to make any alimony payments, while the wife was childless and earned
her own living. The court, citing N. Y. CONST. Art. 1, § 5, which declares
"excessive bail shall not be required nor excessive fines imposed, nor shall
cruel and imrwral tnoiishment be inflicted," released the husband from imprisonment. (Italics ours.) In the case of Tenchini v. Tenchini, reported in
92 N. Y. L. J.607:3, Sept. 1, 1934, the court allowed the husband to be placed
in the custody of his counsel after he had proved that as a result of his confinement his business had suffered to the point where he was being dispossessed.
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carcerated. His income and earning capacity are not known to the
court. Are we to adopt the proposition that the court should deny
the wife's motion and accept the husband's plea of poverty merely
because he advances affidavits stating his inability to comply with
the decree? The resulting evils of such a practice are too selfevident to admit of argument. It would seem then, that something
more than the mere statement of poverty in the affidavits of the
husband is necessary to produce a clear picture of the defendant's
financial status.
An examination of the reports of other jurisdictions discloses
the interesting fact that the weight of authority holds to the proposition that the burden of conclusively proving his financial inability to
comply with an alimony decree is upon the defendant husband and
that affidavits merely stating his inability, as distinguished from affidavits stating facts tending to prove his inability to pay, are in themselves insufficient to establish such inability.16 Nor is this an unreasonable requirement. The defendant's financial condition and ability to pay are matters peculiarly within his own knowledge. They
could not be known with any degree of certainty by the wife nor
could she easily produce evidence to maintain the proposition were
the burden of proof placed upon her. 1 7 It is impossible to deny the

logical presumption that in fixing the amount of alimony to be
paid, the court fully investigated the defendant's pecuniary condition
and resources and directed him to pay only such reasonable sum as
he was able to pay; consequently when it is shown that he has disobeyed the order of the court, a prima facie case of contempt is made
against him and the burden is therefore upon him to show that it
was not in his power to obey the decree.' 8 If the defendant can by
uncontroverted evidence establish the fact that his failure to pay the
judgment awarded his wife as alimony is the result of lack of funds,
the prima facie case is overcome and it would be a distinct error to
keep him confined under a contempt order.' 9 Where the circumstances of the case do not justify commitment, such commitment
would be defeating the very purpose sought to be accomplished. As
pointed out by the court in Tenchini v. Tenchini,20 "certain it is that
his financial position is not being improved by his remaining in jail,
and his ability to take care of the alimony and counsel fees for which
" Shaffner v. Shaffner, 212 Ill. 492, 72 N. E. 447 (1904) ; Hurd v. Hurd, 63
Minn. 443, 65 N. W. 728 (1896); Ramsay v. Ramsay, 125 Miss. 185, 87 So.
491 (1921); Clark v. Clark, 152 Tenn. 431, 278 S. W. 65 (1925); Branch v.
Branch, 144 Va. 244, 132 S. E. 303 (1926).
"'
Holtham v. Holtham, 6 Misc. 266, 26 N. Y. Supp. 762 (1893) ; State v.
Cook, 66 Ohio St. 566, 64 N. E. 567, 58 L. R. A. 625 (1902); Andrew v.
Andrew, 62 Vt. 495, 20 Atl. 817 (1890).
"In re Rasmussen, 56 Cal. App. 368, 205 Pac. 72 (1922); Collins v.
Collins, 158 So. 915 (Miss. 1935); Armijo v. Armijo, 29 N. M. 15, 217 Pac.
623 (1923); Strobridge v. Strobridge, 21 Hun 288 (N. Y. 1880).
"Heflinger v. Heflinger, 172 Ga. 889, 159 S. E. 242 (1931); Peel v. Peel,
50 Iowa
521 (1879)
andY.cases
sepra
note
'Reported
in 92;Nq.
L. J.cited
607:3,
Sept.
1, 7.
1934.
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the wife prays and which has been awarded to her is no nearer payment by reason of his lodgment in jail." It is not the desire of the
court to deprive a man of his liberty and it demands of the defendant no more than distinct reasonable proof of his inability to pay
and that such inability is honest and is not due to acts of his own
volition. 2 ' Of course, where the defendant contumaciously renders
22
himself unable to obey the decree by transferring his property,
secreting the same 23 or remarrying, 2' he cannot successfully plead
inability to pay as a defense; 25 some courts having gone so far as
to hold that a recusant defendant can be imprisoned for contempt
even where
his inability to pay alimony is a result of his refusal to
26
work.
With the above principles in mind, we turn to an examination
of several of the cases decided in New York under the section in
order to observe the manner in which the courts have dispensed the
relief contemplated therein. In the case of Bamboschek v. Bamboschek 2 7 the wife made the usual motion to have the husband punished for contempt because of his failure to pay the alimony awarded
to her. The proof offered by the defendant in his affidavit revealed
that he had no assets, was heavily in debt, and that several large
' 2 State v. Nichol, 142 Ore. 235, 20 P. (2d) 221 (1933).
Carogano v. Carogano, 231 App. Div. 77, 246 N. Y. Supp. 345 (1st
Dept. 1930) (the court refused to release the defendant from imprisonment
because he had transferred his property, secured a foreign divorce and had
remarried).
'Roberts v. Fuller, 210 Iowa 956, 229 N. W. 163 (1930); De Ruiter v.
De Ruiter, 28 Ind. App. 9, 62 N. E. 100 (1901) (the court herein allowed
the wife to have a conveyance set aside as fraudulent, upon showing that it
was made in order to defeat her right to alimony).
' Newburn v. Newburn, 210 Iowa 639, 231 N. W. 389 (1930) ; Kinney v.
Kinney, 231 S. W. 267 (Mo. App. 1921); Lord v. Lord, 37 N. M. 24, 16 P.
(2d) 933 (1932); Ryer v. Ryer, 33 -Hun 16 (N. Y. 1884) (husband's inability to pay alimony was due to the fact that he had remarried in another
state contrary to the decree of divorce rendered in New York. The court denied his motion to be released from imprisonment for contempt) ; State v.
Brown, 31 Wash. 397, 72 Pac. 86 (1903).
Selph v. Selph, 27 Ariz. 176, 231 Pac. 921 (1925) ; Anthony v. Anthony,
1 N. E. (2d) 999, (Ind. 1936) (relief from contempt order denied where it
appeared that the husband was acting in bad faith in failing to carry out the
decree) ; Ryerson v. Ryerson, 194 Minn. 350, 260 N. W. 530 (1935) ; KEEZER,

A

TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE

'0Fowler

(2d ed. 1923) § 793.

v. Fowler, 61 Okla. 280, 161 Pac. 227 (1916). The weight of
authority however, is to the contrary, on the theory that a court cannot compel
a defendant to seek employment and thereby derive the means wherewith to
pay the alimony allotted. Webb v. Webb, 140 Ala. 262, 37 So. 96 (1904);
Wells v. Wells, 99 Wash. 492, 169 Pac. 970 (1918); see 2 SCHOULER, Oh. Cit.
supra note 1, § 1843; see Fredenberg v. Fredenberg, 149 Misc. 391, 266 N. Y.
Supp. 698 (1933) (the court holding that a defendant may not escape punishment for failure to pay alimony by reason of his physical condition, allegedly
preventing him from performinz manual labor, where such condition is the
result of his dissolute habits, and his failure to demonstrate that he has made
fair and reasonable efforts to comply with the decree).
2 150 Misc. 885, 270 N. Y. Sup. 741 (1934), off'd, and modified, 241 App.
Div. 530, 271 N. Y. Supp. 1097 (1st Dept. 1934).
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judgments had been entered against him. It can be conceded therefore, that the defendant satisfactorily sustained the burden of proving his financial inability. The lower court properly denied the motion to punish for contempt but further granted the defendant's
cross-motion for relief under this section by entirely eliminating from
the decree the provision for payment of alimony. 28 In this the court
erred. The true purpose and intention of the statute is to suspend
the auxiliary remedy of incarceration for the enforcement of a judgment given to the wife under Section 1172 of the Civil Practice Act
and to prevent a recurrence of such situations where through imprisonment the defendant is deprived of any opportunity to perform
the terms of the decree. While the court may sometime be confronted with a situation, where, because of the financial independence
and excellent earning capacity of the wife, it would be unjust and
grossly inequitable to award alimony, we must keep in mind that
such cases are outstanding exceptions. The legislature did not intend this section to be used by the courts as a means of modifying
the common-law obligation of the husband to support his wife, an
obligation which is as binding after the breach by the husband of a
marital covenant as before, entitling the wife to a divorce or separation. 29 On appeal, the Appellate Division modified the decree of the
Bamboschek case by disallowing the cross-motion for the elimination of the alimony provision in the original decree and affirmed the
denial of plaintiff's motion to punish for contempt. The defendant
was also directed to pay one-third of his earnings each week to the
plaintiff, and to submit to the attorney for the plaintiff every two
months a sworn statement of his earnings. 30 Cases decided subsequently to the Bamboschek case seem to be well within the purpose
of the statute. In the case of Sampson v. Sampson,31 the alimony
was found to be excessive and beyond the defendant's ability to pay.
It was therefore reduced to an amount commensurate with his earnings and the defendant's motion to be relieved from a contempt order
was granted. In both of the following cases, Birdsall v. Birdsall32
and Singer v. Singer,3 3 the defendants were released from prison
and the payments of alimony were suspended for limited periods of
time. By suspending the payments the courts did not, of course, entirely erase them from the original decrees, as was attempted by
the lower court in the Bamboschek case. The purpose of the suspensions was to give the defendants an opportunity to seek employment and thereby acquire the means to resume the payment of their
obligations. An interesting question, not quite pertinent to the discussion, develops from the above situations. Upon the defendants
Ibid.
SSee Conrad v.Everich, 50 Ohio St. 487, 35 N. E. 58, 59 (1893).
'241 App. Div. 530, 271 N. Y. Supp. 1097 (1st Dept. 1934).
1243 App. Div. 636, 276 N. Y. Supp. 898 (2d Dept. 1935).
'-246 App. Div. 879, 284 N. Y. Supp. 856 (3d Dept. 1936).
'246 App. Div. 850, 285 N. Y. Supp. 16 (2d Dept. 1936).
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subsequently becoming financially able to make the payments, would
they be obligated for the amounts for which they would ordinarily
have been liable were it not for the suspensions? It would seem,
that the answer is in the negative, for, if the alimony payments had
been reduced instead of suspended, and thereafter increased upon application of the wife, it is not likely that the increase would be retroactive, no matter how financially able the defendant might have
become.
In conclusion, it is apparent that the trend in New York is to
forbear the enforcement of a contempt order where the result would
not serve the ends of justice. This trend is in harmony with that of
the majority of other jurisdictions.3 4 Such forbearance is not to be
exercised, however, on the strength of mere statements of a party
under oath that he is financially unable to comply with an alimony
decree 35 since there is no inherent power in the court to relieve a
defendant merely as a matter of grace 6r mercy.3 6 With the rate of
divorce ever on the increase,3 7 easy evasion of alimony payments
would go far to encourage individuals to revolt against the obligations of the marriage bond and to repudiate personal obligations to
the wife and to the community.
HERMAN T. PERS.

3 Orcutt v. Orcutt, 63 N. D. 207, 247 N. W. 372 (1933); Woodard v.
Woodard, 172 Ga. 713, 158 S. E. 569 (1931).
"Clark v. Clark, 152 Tenn. 431, 278 S. W. 65 (1925); Holtham v.
Holtham, 6 Misc. 266, 26 N. Y. Supp. 762 (1893); and cases cited snpra
note 16.
'Moore v. McMahon, 20 Hun 44 (N. Y. 1880); Matter of Canakos.
60 Misc. 63, 11 N. Y. Supp. 601 (1908).
'The number of divorces has increased from about 10,000 a year in
1867 to more than 200,000 in 1929. Population increased during that period
about 300%, marriages almost 400% and divorces about 2,000%. Thus the
rate of divorce increased about five times as rapidly as the proportion of
married population in the United States over a period of 63 years. See
CAHEN, STATISnCAL ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN DIVORCE (1932).

